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Party presidentialization in post-Suharto Indonesia
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ABSTRACT
Indonesia presents an extremely rare quasi-experimental research 
case: the constitutional reforms and the transition to full 
presidentialism have effected a presidentialization of political 
parties that is largely in line with the changes predicted by the 
model of Samuels and Shugart [2010. Presidents, parties and prime 
ministers: How separation of powers affects party organization and 
behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]. Especially the 
rise of the new president and his difficult relationship with his own 
party are testimony to this. But a closer look reveals that the model 
has to be adapted to Indonesian politics. Presidents have tools to 
forge grand coalitions and to overcome the dualism to an extent. The 
size and history of political parties as well as wider socio-economic 
changes, that is an increasing oligarchization of party organization, 
have to be considered. Moreover, highly personalized vehicle 
parties serving the interests of a presidential candidate have 
emerged. It follows that institutional and structural incentives 
combined have produced a party system consisting of different 
party types.
KEYWORDS 
Presidentialism; presidentialization; personalization; party system; vehicle parties; 
Indonesia
Introduction
This paper focuses on the extent to which Indonesian parties and the party system 
have been changed by the shift towards a presidential system. This article shows 
that Indone-sian parties have been transformed by the introduction of direct 
presidential elections, and that processes relatively independent of these institutional 
reforms have an important impact.
I refer to an approach by Samuels and ||Shugart (2010, 2014). They criticize 
the wide notion of presidentialization by Poguntke and ||Webb (2005a, 2005b). 
Poguntke and Webb see presidentialization as being closely connected to 
personalization. In many par-liamentary systems (but also in some presidential 
systems) they identify a presidentializa-tion of politics that is indicated by growing 
power resources at the disposal of prime ministers in relation to the executive 
and their own party/coalition. In this context, the party apparatus loses its impact, 
and parties win elections through adroit marketing cam-paigns and popular poli-
ticians. Instead, Samuels and Shugart focus on the strict separation of the executive 
and legislative branches of government within presidential systems and its direct 
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perspective, presidents do not have to permanently seek the backing of their 
parties/coalitions, and members of parliament are less dependent on the executive 
head.
Against the background of the Samuels/Shugart model, this paper analyses 
political developments in Indonesia after 1998, but with a focus on recent events. It 
demonstrates that the country represents a very rare quasi-experimental research case 
given that it has fairly recently switched from having an indirectly elected president to 
having a full presi-dential system in 2004, which has fundamentally changed the party 
system.
This paper proceeds as follows: first, it outlines the salient constitutional reforms 
and discusses in the second part the model by Samuels/Shugart. Third, it uses 
two case studies – Golkar (Partai Golkar) and the Democratic Party of Indonesia–
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P) – to analyse whether the 
predicted transform-ations have taken place. Fourth, it adapts Samuels and Shugart’s 
model to the specificities of the Indonesian context; and fifth, it discusses the 
emergence of vehicle parties. These parties are highly personalized ad hoc 
organizations with ready-made platforms and are usually financially dependent on a 
charismatic leader or his/her financial backers.
The article largely corroborates the model by Samuels and Shugart, but also 
explains major aberrations of it, in particular the rise of vehicle parties, the role of 
oligarchization, and with reference to presidential strategies to overcome the dualism. 
The article is inno-vative because it (i) sheds new light on the mechanics of political 
parties in Indonesia, (ii) tests Samuels and Shugart’s model with one of the most 
interesting cases worldwide, and (iii) provides us with a better understanding of a new 
party type, vehicle parties.
Constitutional transitions
Constitutional development in Indonesia was turbulent from the start (Horowitz, 2013; 
Kawamura, 2013a, 2013b; Sherlock, 2015). After declaring independence in 1945, 
the country established a presidential system. It then switched to a parliamentary 
system in 1946,1 which lasted until 1959, when President Sukarno declared himself 
prime minister and created the Gotong Royong (Mutual Help) Parliament as part of his 
Guided Democracy regime. In 1963 Sukarno became president for life. During the 
New Order (1966–98), Suharto (officially president since 1968) amassed enormous 
and almost unchecked power; the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) was only on paper the highest state organ.
Because Suharto controlled Golkar, the regime party, he was able to subdue the 
PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia; Democratic Party of Indonesia) and the United 
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembanguan, PPP), which were the two semi-
oppositional parties. He manipulated elections in order to guarantee supermajorities in 
both parliaments and he – as the sole candidate – was always unanimously elected. 
This Demokrasi Pancasila (‘Pancasila Democracy’)2 within a ‘family state’ with 
Suharto as bapak (‘father’) and the principle of musyawarah dan mufakat 
(‘deliberation and consensus’) without any mean-ingful opposition served to legitimate 
the neo-patrimonial rule of the president and his sycophants.
Since 1999, Indonesian elections have essentially been free and fair. The 
country’s system of government and electoral laws have been continuously changed 
(Horowitz, 2013). In 1999/2000 the lawmaking powers of the House of Representatives 
(Dewan Per-wakilan Rakyat, DPR) were strengthened considerably. Nevertheless, the 
period after the
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fall of Suharto was marked by uncertainty. The Constitution was ill-defined, and 
the impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001 was the result of a power 
struggle between the DPR, the MPR, and a president who strongly disagreed with 
Parliament in regard to defining the authority of his office.
In some respects, Indonesia was presidential before 2004. The president, especially 
as interpreted by Abdurrahman Wahid (though less so by Megawati Sukarnoputri), was 
per-ceived by many as powerful as a chief executive in a full presidential system. 
Moreover, incentives were high for political parties to support the president in exchange 
for govern-ment positions. Abdurrahman Wahid built a rainbow coalition in order to 
secure strong parliamentary support because his own party, the National 
Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), was relatively small. After 
Megawati came to power following Wahid’s impeachment, she was also keen to 
secure the permanent backing of most parties and thus continued the tradition of 
forming rainbow coalitions.
In 2002, and as a reaction to the upheaval created by Wahid’s fall, it was decided to 
hold direct presidential elections for the first time in the country’s history in 2004. This 
reform constituted the full institutionalization of a presidential system. Before, that is 
during the transition period from 1998 until 2004, the system was parliamentary 
according to stan-dard definitions because the president was only elected indirectly 
by the MPR. Yet strong presidential elements were also typical for this hybrid 
(Sherlock, 2015, p. 94f). This was a legacy of New Order authoritarianism.
Since 2004, Indonesian presidentialism has been characterized by both a strong 
presi-dent and a strong DPR. Today, the DPR consists of 560 members elected in 
77 multi-member constituencies.3 Legislation on DPR elections has been 
significantly changed, with open lists of candidates replacing closed lists of 
candidates. In 2014, an open list was fully implemented; in 2009, the relevant 
regulation was issued just prior to the elec-tions and not yet solidly effective. Whereas 
the closed-list system saw candidates selected by the central party leadership, the open-
list system means that candidates from the same party vie for votes in their respective 
constituencies although voters retain their right to vote for parties rather than single 
candidates.
Besides, direct elections of regional heads (pilihan kepala daerah, also known as 
pilkada) were introduced in 2005. Previously, provincial and district/municipality 
parliaments had the authority to select governors, district heads, and mayors. 
Candidates are now nomi-nated by a party or a coalition of parties.4 Furthermore, in 
order to mitigate the politiciza-tion of ethnic and religious cleavages, pilkada and 
presidential candidates always run for office in pairs. This two-ticket system helps to blur 
ideological divides because the two can-didates usually represent different regions and/
or diverse religious communities. More-over, at the provincial and district/
municipality level a range of surprising party coalitions, for instance between 
Islamist and Christian parties were formed.
One might argue that the decisive step towards a more thorough presidentialization of 
politics came with the introduction of pilkada in 2005. Pilkada provided new local and 
regional elites with the opportunity to prove their qualities as politicians and administra-
tors at the subnational level, which enabled people such as President Joko 
Widodo (‘Jokowi’) and Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’) to advance 
their unprece-dented careers. The political party establishment needed a few years to 
grasp the funda-mental shifts that had occurred following the introduction of direct local 
elections. Once they had, they tried to revert back to the old system of indirect elections. 
However, it was
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already too late, and their reform proposals faced stiff resistance by a politically 
well-informed civil society.
The introduction of pilkada and the open-list system has resulted in candidates 
having increased autonomy from their respective political parties (Aspinall & 
Sukmajati, 2016; Buehler & Johnson Tan, 2007; Buehler, 2010; Choi, 2011, 2015; 
Erb & Priyambudi, 2009; Hadiz, 2010).
Presidentialism and presidentialization: the Samuels and Shugart model
The literature on Indonesian parties has, so far, hardly dealt with the impact of 
presidenti-alism on political parties. The exceptions are Djayadi Hanan (2012), who 
indeed focused on the workings of the presidential system in general, and Koichi 
Kawamura (2013a). This paper does not probe whether the Indonesian presidential 
system is perilous for demo-cratic consolidation (Fukuyama, Dressel, & Chang, 2005), 
leads to gridlock and deadlock (Djayadi, 2012; Kawamura, 2013b), or is generally 
marked by a difficult relationship between presidents and multiparty systems 
(Hanta Yuda, 2010; Mainwaring, 1993); rather, it looks at the effects of 
presidentialization on parties, particularly with reference to Samuels and Shugart 
(2010; see also Passarelli, 2015a).
It argues that context-sensitive institutionalism is particularly helpful in analysing the 
mechanics and shape of parties and party systems. The specific reactions of 
political actors to institutional incentives with reference to a comparatively tested model 
tells us a lot about Indonesian specifics and helps to put other factors in perspective.
Indonesia is a very useful quasi-experimental test case for Samuels and 
Shugart’s model because (i) it is one of the very few countries that have 
experienced a shift towards a presidential system and (ii) the party system has been 
transformed, at least partially, in the manner predicted by Samuels and Shugart 
(2010). Samuels and Shugart (2010, p. 170ff) present two quasi-experimental 
cases that have clearly vindi-cated the presidentialization thesis. The first is 
France where the political regime shifted from pure parliamentarism to semi-
presidentialism. The constitutional reforms have encouraged ‘political personalization, 
a decline in the importance of ideology, and the marginalization of party 
organization from political campaigns’ (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 171). De 
Gaulle’s powerful personality, for example, undermined party institutionalization of 
the Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) that was created ahead of the 
elections, and Mitterrand joined the Socialist Party only after he had announced his 
presidential candidacy. He stood above the party and had his own personal 
campaign organization. Interparty politics was presidentialized because interparty 
competition began to revolve around presidential elections. The Communist Party, for 
example, toned down its ideologies when it supported socialist candidates. But later 
on, since 2002, almost all parties began to present presidential candidates as a 
form of political advertisement. This helped radical parties such as the National 
Front to establish a national presence.
In Israel, direct elections of the prime minister were introduced in 1992 (and after 
less than a decade abolished because of disastrous effects). In this very unique 
case that resembled presidentialism, executive and legislative origin were 
separated, but the directly elected prime minister could lose his office via a vote of 
no confidence. Within
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a short time period parties were presidentialized and then de-presidentialized after the 
abrogation of the 1992 reforms (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 181).
Major parties began to downplay ideology, nominated relative outsiders, focused on 
vote-seeking strategies, whereas smaller parties concentrated on office- or 
policy-seeking campaigns and did not even present prime-ministerial candidates. 
Thus, the party system was bifurcated. In the end, organizational survival of the 
two largest parties was threatened.
In its pure form, parliamentarism is characterized by an executive branch that 
consists of a prime minister and a cabinet which are collectively responsible to 
parliament. Presi-dentialism, on the other hand, is marked by the executive branch’s dual 
origin and distinct survival strategies: the president and parliament are both directly 
elected, and the presi-dent can only be removed through impeachment and not by a 
majority of members of Parliament (MPs) (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 4). 
Parliamentarized parties ‘select their agents from within their own top ranks and 
maintain effective control over those agents after they ascend to the top 
executive positions’, whereas presidentialized parties ‘delegate discretion to agents 
who may have been selected for characteristics unre-lated to their faithfulness to the 
party itself and who cannot be recalled’ (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 251). Here, 
Samuels and Shugart are referring to a principal–agent model, in which presidents 
or prime ministers serve as agents of their principals (i.e. pol-itical parties, party 
coalitions, or voters) in direct elections.
The presidentialization of political parties signifies specific organizational and 
behav-ioural characteristics (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 6). The separate election of the 
president and the parliament ‘enhances the incentives for politicians in different 
branches of the same party to go their own way’ (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 9). 
Survival is mutually assured because impeaching a president is difficult and because 
presidents do not have the power to dissolve parliaments. The two parts of the party 
supporting the president, that is the legislative, and the executive ‘branches’, are split 
because of the constitutional separation of powers. Presidentialized parties exhibit less 
intraparty leadership account-ability and they ‘‘pre-select’ candidates who will be the 
voters’ direct agent’ (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 65). Presidentialism generally 
hinders the organizational development of parties. Samuels and Shugart also predict 
that attempts to coordinate different cam-paigns will result in collective action problems 
and that political parties will sacrifice pro-grammatic commitments. Based on their 
thorough examination of the biographical information of prime ministers and 
presidents in democracies from 1945 to 2007, Samuels and Shugart found that the 
rise of outsiders is another indicator of the presiden-tialization of political parties.
Samuels and Shugart’s model of presidentialization is innovative because it 
highlights the huge impact of the system of government on the structure of parties and 
the behav-iour of party elites. This is something that has seldom been systematically 
addressed by the literature on Indonesian parties.
Cases of presidentialized parties: Golkar and PDI-P
With reference to Samuels and Shugart (2010), Koichi Kawamura (2013a, p. 6) 
already pointed out that organizational strength and the chances of winning presidential 
elections are the two factors responsible for the degree of presidentialization.
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If we look at developments within Golkar since the fall of Suharto in 1998 and at 
the supposed executive–legislative dualism, the presidentialization of Golkar began 
with the transition towards direct presidential elections.5 Golkar initiated a national 
convention to select a presidential candidate (Tomsa, 2006, p. 8ff). In these polls 
General Wiranto, the former commander in chief, defeated Akbar Tanjung, the 
Golkar chairperson. Yet, during the presidential campaign, Wiranto was at best only 
partially supported by the Golkar machinery. Following Wiranto’s election defeat and 
Jusuf Kalla’s election as vice president under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Golkar 
split into pro-Kalla and pro-Tanjung camps. In the following months, this created 
serious problems for the Yudhoyono government. In the new DPR, Golkar and the 
PDI-P – supported by two smaller Islamic parties – formed the Nationhood Coalition 
(Koalisi Kebangsaan). Yudhoyono’s PD (Partai Demokrat; Democatic Party) and a 
number of partners established the People’s Coalition (Koalisi Kerakyatan). At the 2004 
DPR leadership elections, the Nationhood Coalition won all five positions. This saw 
Kalla decide to run for the Golkar chairpersonship, which he sub-sequently won. After 
that, Kalla was able to discipline the Golkar caucus within the DPR and to resolve 
deadlocks. This reveals a noticeable dualism between Golkar (within the DPR) and 
the vice president, which was only resolved because the party followed Kalla. These 
developments would not have been realistically possible within a parliamentary 
system.
In 2009, after the parliamentary election, Golkar terminated its partnership with the 
PD and decided to field Jusuf Kalla as its presidential candidate. This caused 
controversy within Golkar because the Tanjung faction expected to get battered by 
Yudhoyono, who was going to run with Boediono, the respected governor of the 
central bank. As it turned out, Kalla did not even get enough votes to proceed to the 
second round of the elections, where Yudhoyono and Boediono beat Megawati and 
Prabowo Subianto. Only a few prominent Golkar politicians had openly supported 
Kalla, whereas many others questioned his decision not to hold a party convention to 
pick the presidential candidate as in 2004. After his defeat, Kalla was made to give way 
to a new Golkar chairperson, the tycoon Aburizal Bakrie – who was selected because of 
his money and influence rather than his popularity.
The next example of internal partizan strife because of collective action problems 
due to direct presidential elections is Aburizal Bakrie’s unsuccessful attempt to be 
nominated as the Golkar presidential candidate for 2014. He failed because of 
disastrous survey results revealing that he trailed behind both Prabowo Subianto 
and Jokowi. Once he showed himself even unable to secure the nomination for vice 
president – a position that was ultimately again filled by Jusuf Kalla – his position 
within Golkar was even more eroded.
Ahead of the presidential elections in 2014, Jokowi rejected the offer by Golkar 
to support his campaign because he did not want to engage in the usual horse-
trading. Thus, Golkar finally backed Prabowo as presidential candidate. Although 
Prabowo lost and Golkar was not part of the new government, Bakrie was 
unanimously re-elected as party chairman in November 2014. Yet, a rival faction 
led by Laksono held another party congress in December. The Minister of Justice and 
Human Rights who has the auth-ority to officially recognize one of the competing 
factions, confirmed Laksono as legal chairman. In the end, the government succeeded 
in getting installed a new Golkar chair-man, Setya Novanto, who was weakened by 
corruption allegations. Golkar became a loyal
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member of the governing coalition, and in 2016 even re-nominated Jokowi for the next 
presidency (Mietzner, 2016, p. 217ff).
The Golkar case evinces the tensions that arise within a party leadership when 
presiden-tial candidates have to be nominated or when a faction within the party wants 
to follow the victors of presidential elections.
The PDI-P has a dynastic character given that Megawati took over the 
chairpersonship of its predecessor, the PDI, in the early 1990s (Mietzner, 2013, p. 
133ff) due to the rever-ence for Sukarno by many Indonesians. In 1996, the regime 
decided to remove Megawati from her position, but after the downfall of Suharto, 
Megawati and her followers estab-lished the PDI-P in 1998. Since then, she has 
been the party’s chairperson and even served as president (2001–2004) following 
the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid. She ran for re-election in 2004 but was 
defeated by her former minister, Yudhoyono. In 2009 she was again unsuccessful in 
her bid to once again be president. Megawati decided against running in 2014 after 
not performing well in opinion polls and being con-vinced by her party followers to make 
way for Jokowi.
The salience of Samuels and Shugart’s model becomes particularly clear regarding 
the developments within the PDI-P since 2013. This will be illustrated with reference 
to the nomination process, the parliamentary and presidential campaigns, cabinet 
formation, the Budi Gunawan affair, the PDI-P congress in April 2015, and, in particular, 
the nomina-tion of an outsider like Jokowi – which is typical of presidential systems 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 64). The selection of outsiders has become 
increasingly common due to the establishment of direct elections and the emergence of 
a professional polling indus-try that serves candidates at all levels. Long-established 
party elites have observed this development with suspicion because it has endowed 
politicians outside the central execu-tive in Jakarta with a more assertive role.
Jokowi incarnates this trend as he was never a dedicated member of the PDI-P and 
also did not belong to the country’s established elites as did Abdurrahman Wahid (as 
son of a minister and as former chairman of Nahdatul Ulama, a traditionalist, quasi-
feudalistic, Muslim organization); Megawati (as Sukarno’s daughter); and Wiranto, 
Prabowo, and Yud-hoyono (as high-ranking New Order generals). Jokowi entered 
presidential office via stints as mayor of the central Javanese city of Solo and as 
governor of Jakarta. His fame as a poli-tician is based on his impromptu visits of local 
markets, his unannounced inspections of offices,6 and his highly pragmatic style of 
governance. One may argue that he was elected president precisely because of his 
humble origins, as well as his determination as a businessman and then as a politician 
who was relatively independent of old-fashioned party politics (Mietzner, 2015a; von 
Luebke, 2014).
In 2014, the unspectacular parliamentary campaign focused more on Prabowo 
and Jokowi and less on parties and platforms. In fact, most PDI-P candidates 
tried to portray themselves as somehow connected to Jokowi, the most popular 
politician at that time (Gammon, 2014). This conforms to Samuels and Shugart 
(2010, p. 13), who contend that presidential elections tend to overshadow the 
preceding parliamentary elections and produce coattail effects because voters are 
inclined to choose the party of the presidential candidate they prefer (Samuels & 
Shugart, 2010, p. 13). In the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary elections, the PD 
was so successful because voters wanted Yudhoyono to become president.7 
Similarly, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, 
Gerindra) gained almost 12% in 2014 because
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of Prabowo.8 Yet, despite the survey predictions, the PDI-P surprisingly barely 
profited from Jokowi’s popularity.
Shortly after the parliamentary elections, the presidential campaign began and 
laid bare the tensions between Jokowi’s team and the PDI-P central executive. 
Jokowi later complained about the lack of party support he received. In the end, 
however, he won the election in spite of his failings when presenting himself as a 
viable alternative to the established political elites. Mietzner (2015a) suggests that 
Jokowi’s success can be attributed to his ability to gather funds via the Internet and 
mobilize thousands of volun-teers from outside the party (e.g. for house-to-house 
campaigning) – a form of electioneer-ing that was new to Indonesia and obviously 
inspired by the Obama presidential campaign in the United States.
Jokowi has never been independent of political parties, because they have the 
sole power to nominate presidential candidates.9 They function as the principal of the 
candi-date (agent). A few weeks after the presidential elections, Jokowi had to decide 
on his cabinet (Burhanuddin, 2015, p. 354ff). He had promised to avoid the usual 
horse-trading and made it clear that he would not automatically reward coalition 
partners with the top executive positions. Nonetheless, his cabinet line-up 
disappointed those who had hoped for a clear break with the past. Although it was 
not a so-called rainbow coalition accommodating almost all political forces in Parliament 
(see below), Jokowi’s dependency on the PDI-P and party chairperson Megawati was 
clear to see: 14 of the 34 members were political appointments. For instance, Ryamizard 
Ryacudu (who has a dubious human rights record) was chosen to be the defence 
minister; Puan Maharani (Megawati’s unpopular daughter) as coordinating minister 
for human development and cultural affairs; and Tjahjo Kumolo (the PDI-P general 
secretary) as the interior minister. To many observers, the composition of the cabinet 
clearly indicated the relative weakness of Jokowi.
The simmering tension between the President Jokowi and the PDI-P became even 
more visible when Budi Gunawan (Megawati’s security aide during her 
presidency) was appointed national police chief with the overwhelming support of the 
DPR. Shortly there-after, the National Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) announced they were investigating Budi, leading the 
national media and civil society activists to vehemently criticize the selection of Budi. 
As a result, Jokowi declared he would postpone the appointment, but also selected a 
panel to advise him in this matter. What followed was a fierce battle between the 
police and the KPK and the biggest crisis of Jokowi’s presidency so far. The conflict 
between the president and the PDI-P peaked when leading PDI-P members, among 
them cabinet members, supported the police in attacking the KPK. On this occasion 
four KPK commissioners were arrested because of past offences. Deputy 
Commissioner Bambang Widjojanto, for example, was apprehended when a PDI-P 
politician pressed charges against him. At the same time, pro-minent PDI-P members 
pressured Jokowi to confirm the appointment of Budi Gunawan. After some 
deliberation, Jokowi finally decided to nominate a less controversial figure for the role 
of national police chief (Burhanuddin, 2015, p. 361f).
The dualism between the president and the PDI-P came to a head during the party 
con-gress in Bali in April 2015 when Megawati expressed her frustration over the limited 
influ-ence of the PDI-P within the cabinet and parliamentary caucus with regard to policy-
making. She also tried to re-establish her role as the grey eminence behind the president. 
She did this within a party that is now the most centralized and personalized in the 
country. Megawati
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had been re-elected as chairperson six months before the congress.10 She had chosen 
and announced the national management board and the central executive, on which 
sat her daughter, Puan Maharani, and son, Prananda Prabowo. In her speech at the 
congress Mega-wati made it clear that the president is only a servant to the party (and 
her); Jokowi himself was not allowed to speak during the congress (Kompas, ‘Kongres 
PDIP’, 2015). Megawati interpreted the relation between her party and Jokowi as one 
where the party instructs its candidate and delegate (petugas) to act in its name 
(Kompas, ‘Megawati: Mestinya’, 2015). She also indirectly criticized those close to 
Jokowi, such as Andi Widjojanto, the cabinet secretary, and Luhut Pandjaitan, the chief 
of presidential staff.
In July 2016, Jokowi reshuffled his cabinet quite independently from PDI-P. This 
became evident, for example, by his enduring reliance on Rini Soemarno, the minister 
for state-owned enterprises. She had helped to finance and organize his campaign, and 
Megawati ‘consistently demanded Rini be removed from cabinet’ (Warburton, 2016, 
p. 304), but Jokowi always refused this. At that time, Jokowi’s approval rating rose 
to almost 70%, he held sway over a large multi-party coalition, and Megawati was less 
powerful than in previous years.
Adapting Samuels and Shugart’s model to the Indonesian context
The PDI-P exemplifies the relevance of Samuels and Shugart’s model. But if one 
takes a closer look at Indonesia as a test case, certain amendments and revisions are 
necessary. These are essentially compatible with the Samuels/Shugart model, but are 
necessary to understand the dynamics of party politics in Indonesia.
Although the supposed dualism between the executive and legislative ‘branches’ of the 
party is plausible in the case of Jokowi and Megawati, the relationship is much more 
intri-cate because some of the ministers have been more loyal towards Megawati 
than to Jokowi. It is, thus, expedient to distinguish between the party central 
executive, the party in parliament, and the party representatives in the cabinet. 
Moreover, Indonesian presidents have to rely on coalitions and ministers that are, 
at times, more loyal towards their own parties and often have to work against the 
interests of a conservative and obstructive bureaucracy (Sherlock, 2015). Even within 
Parliament, the cohesion of the caucuses ( fraksi) is not always guaranteed. Members 
of the commissions (komisi), in par-ticular, often act quite independently of the caucus 
leadership.
Furthermore, Samuels and Shugart’s model does not factor in political culture or 
infor-mal institutions. The presidency under Yudhoyono was marked by intensive 
consensus-seeking. Yudhoyono saw himself as a mediator between the different groups 
in Parliament (Sherlock, 2015, p. 110) and strived to ensure stability and avoid conflict. 
Perhaps this was the outgrowth of a deeply engrained political culture of 
‘deliberation and consensus’ (musyawarah dan mufakat). Under both Sukarno and 
Suharto reconciliation efforts were typical. During the New Order musyawarah dan 
mufakat became an instrument used by Suharto to ensure harmony in legislative-
related political processes and ‘the predominant institutional mechanism in decision 
making in the legislature’ (Djayadi, 2012, p. 399). Voting was avoided and decisions 
were usually reached by consensus. It has been part of the DPR’s standing orders 
since 1971. Moreover, the current Indonesian presidential system ‘determines that the 
executive and legislative must get involved from the begin-ning (i.e. the initiation of a 
bill) until a bill is approved and enacted as a law’ (Djayadi, 2012,
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p. 402). This process of joint deliberation and joint approval guarantees a high level 
of executive–legislative integration.
In a similar vein, all presidents before Jokowi relied on so-called rainbow 
coalitions encompassing the majority of parties represented in the DPR. Cabinets 
have always been a mix of technocrats with no or little connection to political 
parties, on the one hand, and politicians from all the parties in the coalition, on the 
other. Because cabinets must also reflect informal gender, regional, religious, and 
ethnic quotas, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono found it very difficult not to alienate any of their supporters.
The first rainbow coalition was created during the presidency of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, who was elected by the MPR. Because Wahid only headed a small party, 
the PKB, he needed broad support from a range of other parties. This backing required 
remuneration in the form of ministerial positions. Abdurrahman Wahid relied on the 
so-called poros tengah or ‘central axis’ of Muslim parties, but he knew from the start 
that the modernist Muslim coalition partners within the poros tengah could easily 
retract their support. The president’s relationship with the DPR and the MPR was ill-
defined in the Constitution, and Wahid essentially interpreted his presidency differently 
from how Parliament did. In spite of having the support of a broad coalition, Wahid 
was later impeached and forced to leave office. Although Wahid’s erratic and 
provocative style justified his removal, his successors saw his downfall as an 
important lesson and continued the practice of forming rainbow coalitions. In the 
case of Yudhoyono there was no exigency to do this, at least not after the 2009 
elections when his PD were clear winners with almost 21% of the vote.11
Another factor is the role of party size.12 Samuels and Shugart noted that in France 
with a directly elected president and separation of executive survival one would expect 
most or all parties to become presidentialized whereas in Israel with a directly elected 
prime min-ister dependent on assembly confidence one would foresee a bifurcation 
of the party system because only the larger parties enter the presidential 
elections and, thus, become presidentialized (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 167 and 
191).
This bifurcation is also typical for the Indonesian party system. Huge parties such 
as Golkar and PDI-P are strongly presidentialized. Especially the Islamic parties have 
been unable to present highly electable candidates and are much less 
presidentialized. In fact, the PKB is the only Islamic party to have received more than 
10% of the vote since 2004. The more traditionalist PKB and National Mandate Party 
(Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) are linked to the mass Muslim organizations Nahdatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah, respectively, and have large followings. Nonetheless, 
since 2004 they have focused on being part of larger coalitions.
Yet, this does not mean that smaller parties are not directly affected by the dynamics 
of a presidential system. In recent years, intervention by the government and the 
incentive to join the government have had an impact on intraparty elections and party 
objectives. Not only in Golkar, but also in PPP and in PAN, a pro-government faction took 
control and then managed the entry into Jokowi’s coalition (Warburton, 2016, p. 300). 
In PPP, incumbent Suryadharma Ali lost against a faction led by Muhammad 
Romahurmuziy. In PAN, a faction led by Zulkifli Hasan defeated Hatta Rajasa, the 
running mate of Prabowo in 2014. The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, PKS) is a cadre party that draws most of its support from young urban 
middle-class activists. Dwindling electoral
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support due to corruption scandals, but most probably also the electoral defeat 
as member party of the Prabowo coalition in 2014, triggered the removal of party 
leaders hostile to Jokowi (Mietzner, 2016, p. 226). All this means that the logic of 
competition within presidential systems even has an influence on power struggles 
within smaller parties.
The realities faced by the Islamic parties mentioned above also show that different 
lega-cies of party organization (Mietzner, 2013, p. 33ff and 114ff; Panebianco, 1988) 
have to be considered (see in this vein: Passarelli, 2015b). After the fall of Suharto, 
around 200 political parties were established – many of which reflected different 
political traditions and rep-resented certain social milieus. Political parties have always 
been structured by social clea-vages (Baswedan, 2004; King, 2003; Ufen, 2008), which 
was especially the case for those that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s. The degree 
of personalization and the strength of clientelistic linkages depends on these social 
roots and, therefore, on ideological and organizational legacies. If parties are not 
rooted because of certain path dependencies, they thend to be more personalized and 
less characterized by programmatic ties to voters.
Vehicle parties as a result of presidentialization?
The current Parliament is essentially trifurcated with two strongly presidentialized 
parties, four smaller parties (all Islamic) that are relatively well-institutionalized but not 
very presi-dentialized (if at all), and several vehicle parties. This is the most important 
revision of the Samuels/Shugart model. The oligarchization of politics has 
fundamentally changed party organization and behaviour.
Vehicle parties are highly personalized ad hoc organizations that have ready-made 
plat-forms and centre around a leader who possesses charismatic qualities, though not 
necess-arily so. These parties are usually financially dependent on this leader or 
the leader’s personal financial backers and have the sole aim of helping the leader 
obtain a top gov-ernment position. Establishing a vehicle party requires a great deal of 
money and is only possible in an environment where money matters – one where 
politics is commercialized, campaigns are expensive, and even the organizing of 
intraparty structures depends on financial incentives. But such investment is dependent 
on the possible benefits. A poten-tial vehicle party leader will only be willing to spend 
millions of US dollars if he or she has a realistic chance of securing a top executive 
position, the presidency, or the prime minister-ship. Therefore, the vehicle party option is 
viable in countries like Thailand and the Philip-pines, where political parties are very 
weak, can be built from scratch, or taken over and party factions can be bought. 
After 2004, Indonesia also became fertile ground for vehicle parties due to the fact 
that they enable candidates to secure presidential nomina-tions without having 
necessarily achieved a majority in the parliamentary elections prior to the presidential 
polls.
Because the establishment of such vehicles is a direct result of the shift towards a 
pre-sidential system in Indonesia, these parties are also presidentialized – but in the 
most extreme form. In anticipation of the usual dualism, candidates form their own 
parties and evade collective action problems. It has to be added, that they do so 
only if they fail to get nominated by established parties – as Prabowo did after he lost 
the Golkar pre-sidential primary in 2004.
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Yudhoyono relied on the newly formed PD as he knew that the PDI-P would not 
give him the 2004 nomination despite his popularity, because Megawati would not 
have allowed him to run (Honna, 2012). The PD, the People’s Conscience Party 
(Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura), Gerindra, and the National Democratic Party 
(Partai Nasional Demokrat, Partai NasDem) were all set up shortly before or after 
the constitutional reforms in 2002 and serve the interests of political leaders who are 
able to build party machineries from scratch within only a few years given their 
enormous financial resources or backing by big capital. In 2006 Hanura was founded by 
retired generals and is led by the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 
Wiranto, who also served as minister of defence and coordinating minister for political 
and security affairs. Gerindra was estab-lished in early 2008 and is the vehicle of ex-
general and former son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo lost the 2004 
Golkar presidential convention and saw no rea-listic chance of rising to the top within 
Golkar afterwards. Media tycoon Surya Paloh also failed in 2004 but decided to 
remain with Golkar. But after also losing in 2009, against Aburizal Bakrie, he set up 
the Partai NasDem in 2011 – though he frequently denied wanting the presidency.
Whereas in Gerindra, Hanura, and Partai NasDem a dualism never really arose, it 
did within the PD (Mietzner, 2013, p. 137ff). The Partai Demokrat was not established 
by Yud-hoyono, but on behalf of him, and it took him a few years until March 2004, a 
few weeks ahead of the parliamentary elections and after a quarrel with Megawati, to fully 
support PD as his vehicle. He formulated the party doctrine in December 2001 and 
the PD sub-sequently advocated for the constitutional reform towards direct 
presidential elections (Honna, 2012, p. 475ff). When he launched his new cabinet in 
October 2004, he largely ignored the leadership of the PD. A dualism had taken 
shape. Strong factionalism within the PD was resolved by the intervention of 
Yudhoyono during the first party con-gress in 2005. It became clear that the PD was 
his party: his brother-in-law was chosen to be party chairperson; his son Edi Baskoro, 
head of leadership training; and Yudhoyono himself, chairperson of the Advisory 
Council (Dewan Pembina), the most powerful party body (Honna, 2012, p. 480).
The tensions between Yudhoyono and the party leadership flared up again at the 
2010 congress, when Anas Urbaningrum won the chairpersonship and not Yudhoyono’s 
favour-ite Andi Mallarangeng. Although Anas was still overshadowed by Yudhoyono as 
chairper-son of the newly established High Assembly (Majelis Tinggi), he occasionally 
bypassed the official secretary-general and son of Yudhoyono, Edi Baskoro, in daily 
decision-making (Honna, 2012, p. 487). When the PD walked out of Parliament in 
September 2014, they enabled a bill abolishing direct local elections to be passed. 
In response, Yudhoyono issued an emergency decree to overturn the bill, 
threatened to form a coalition with Jokowi against Prabowo’s coalition, and 
succeeded in preventing the abolition of pilkada (Burhanuddin, 2015, p. 356). The 
PD was thus largely a product of Yudhoyono, but a dualism between the president 
and his party was palpable.
The role model for the PD, and probably all other Indonesian vehicle parties, 
was Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thais Love Thais party (Thai Rak Thai, TRT) in Thailand 
(McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). Thaksin was a media 
mogul and billio-naire who succeeded in achieving an absolute parliamentary 
majority by, inter alia, winning over (or buying) factions from other parties.13 The 
whole TRT media campaign was focused on Thaksin, who used his own media 
machinery and professionals. The
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TRT had no real social roots but skilfully crafted a political programme informed by 
surveys. The TRT is the best example of presidentialization within a parliamentary 
system according to Poguntke and ||Webb (2005a, 2005b).
But what does that mean for Indonesian vehicle parties? Could it be that their rise 
was caused by factors other than the presidentialization à la Samuels and Shugart? 
Samuels and Shugart acknowledge that parties in parliamentary systems may be 
presidentialized – such as in Italy (Berlusconi and Forza Italia) and in Japan (Koizumi 
and the Liberal Demo-cratic Party) and, of course, Thailand (Thaksin and the TRT) – 
but presidentialization ‘is at odds with the core logic of parliamentarism, and it is likely 
the exception rather than the rule or a trend across all systems’ (Samuels & Shugart, 
2010, p. 17). In this vein, for Kawa-mura (2013a) vehicle parties are not 
presidentialized because the executive–legislative dualism does not have any impact 
on party organization. This is true, but under specific circumstances the 
presidentialization of parties does not lead to the supposed dualism, but engenders 
just the opposite, parties marked by monolithic structures.
Without going into much detail (see Ufen, 2013), although party politics is still 
charac-terized by, inter alia, religious, class, and geographic cleavages, various 
developments since the 1950s (when cleavages or aliran were still predominantly 
shaping the party system) and 1998 in particular have led to weaker linkages 
between voters and parties, blurred programmatic profiles of parties, and weaker 
institutionalization (Johnson Tan, 2015; Tomsa, 2008). Today, there is a trend 
towards building grand coalitions at all levels (as ‘cartels’: see Ambardi, 2008; Slater, 
2004), whereas political Islam and the ideol-ogies of the 1950s (e.g. nationalism, 
socialism, and communism) are less salient. Political parties are increasingly dealigned 
from their voter base as a result of weakened political ideologies, tenuous links to 
mass organizations, the pluralization of lifestyles, the indivi-dualization of voters, and 
the mediatization and commercialization of politics (Ufen, 2013). Indicators reveal 
that party identification is dwindling and vote switching is rising (Mietzner, 2013, p. 44).
At the grass-roots level parties are now weaker because of the professionalization 
of campaigning and party leaders’ preference to communicate directly with voters via 
tele-vision or new media. The introduction of direct presidential elections, the pilkada, 
and the open-list system have led to the emergence of a huge polling and consultancy 
industry and have made campaigning much more expensive than it was in 1999 and 
2004 (Mietz-ner, 2015b; Qodari, 2010; Ufen, 2010). Today, many DPR candidates 
employ survey insti-tutes to gauge their electability, and professional campaign 
teams engage in political marketing activities long before the polls. The so-called 
victory teams (tim sukses) of pre-sidential candidates consist of consultants, politicians, 
and businessmen, amongst others, who together develop rather sophisticated public 
relations strategies and often find them-selves competing with the political party 
machineries.
The new roles of pollsters and ‘professionalism’ in elections led to rising costs, 
especially after 2004 (Mietzner, 2013, p. 207ff; Qodari, 2010; Ufen, 2010). Different forms 
of patronage are obvious (Allen, 2015; Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016; 
Shin, 2015; Tomsa, 2015): politicians often have to pay for their candidacies, and 
party functionaries buy votes from delegates at party congresses. Commercialization in 
combination with an inef-ficient political finance regime (Mietzner, 2015b) has furthered 
the dependency of party apparatuses on oligarchs (Robison & Hadiz, 2013; Winters, 
2013). Examples for such mag-nates-cum-politicians are Sutrisno Bachir (former 
chairperson of PAN), Jusuf Kalla (former
13
chairperson of Golkar), Surya Paloh (chairperson of Partai NasDem), and Aburizal 
Bakrie (former chairperson of Golkar). Gerindra is financed by Prabowo and his 
brother Hasyim Djojohadikusumo (Aspinall, 2015, p. 10ff). Some of these oligarchs are 
big players in the media industry. The Bakrie Group owns Anteve and TVOne; Surya 
Paloh, Metro TV. Hary Tanoesoedibjo (RCTI, MNC TV, Global TV) has supported 
Hanura and Wiranto (Tapsell, 2015). An example of the influence of party oligarchs 
on Jokowi are his dealings with Surya Paloh, Prabowo, and Aburizal Bakrie, who 
were allegedly granted dubious conces-sions for their companies (Burhanuddin, 2015, p. 
359 and 365)14, and his close cooperation with ministers Rini Soemarno, Luhut 
Panjaitan, and Amran Sulaimin (Warburton, 2016, p. 304).
The commercialization of politics and the rise of oligarchs have transformed the 
Indo-nesian party system in a way that overshadows the mechanisms described by 
Samuels and Shugart. Within a short period of time, tycoons have built successful 
political parties with branches spread all over the country without any programmatic 
profile (Robison & Hadiz, 2013).
Concluding remarks
The Samuels and Shugart’s model explains major transformations that have 
been observed since the introduction of direct presidential elections. The tensions 
between the president and the president’s party or coalition are a logical result of 
this reform. The difficult relationship between the PDI-P and President Jokowi, an 
outsider, is the best example of the dualism between the executive and legislative 
‘branches’ of a party.
But this institutionalist approach by Samuels and Shugart does not systematically 
take into account other, parallel developments. The shift towards a presidential system 
and the pilkada as well as the open candidate list have accelerated a process of 
commercialization of politics which is characterized by rising campaign expenses and 
a preponderance of rich candidates. This has further augmented the role of 
businesspeople within parties. In the wake of this commercialization and the increased 
impact of personalities, political parties have become more and more dealigned from 
their grass roots. The whole process can be understood as an oligarchization marked 
by (a) the increasing role of money in party politics, and (b) the growing impact by very 
few people (the oligarchs) on the finan-cing and the decision-making of political parties.
Oligarchization means that the logic of oligarchic economic interests extends into the 
political realm, resulting in the political relationships between principals and agents often 
being altered by economic linkages. ‘Western’ political science tends to see these 
relation-ships as merely political, but in Indonesia and many other non-Western countries 
business-people from outside the political system sometimes operate as presidents’ 
principals. Moreover, businesspeople who take over political parties demand 
compensation for their support of presidential candidates.
The typical dualism is to an extent weakened by coalitional presidentialism (or 
the building of a party cartel), and under Jokowi by intervention in internal affairs of 
other parties. This means that the Samuels/Shugart model, especially in the case of 
Indonesia, has to take into account the significance of strategies to tone down 
the conflicts between the executive head and his adversaries.
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The institutional change and the oligarchization have resulted in a trifurcation of the 
party system with larger, presidentialized parties; smaller, weakly 
presidentialized parties; and vehicle parties. These highly personalized vehicle parties 
are a direct response to this shifting political environment. Only these two mechanisms 
combined, presidenti-alism plus oligarchic commercialization, were able to cause the 
emergence and success of vehicle parties.
One may argue that Samuels and Shugart’s model is mostly valid for 
presidential systems with relatively strong parties. In the Philippines political parties 
are so weak that MPs defect from losing parties to the president’s camp. Because of 
that, the predicted dualism between executive and legislative branches is not salient. 
Most parties are merely vehicles for presidential candidates. In the United States, 
lawmakers rarely defect, because the two main parties are well institutionalized and 
have different political platforms. Indo-nesia mixes these two types to an extent. MPs 
usually do not defect from losing parties after the elections, but some parties as a 
whole may switch sides after the polls. But even these vehicle parties are not quickly 
dissolved following an election defeat. In the United States parties such as Hanura 
and Gerindra would not even emerge, whereas in the Philippines they would probably 
quickly vanish.
Victories of politicians like Jokowi are only possible because of the personalization 
of the electoral process. Although Jokowi is backed by various oligarchs, he is 
relatively immune to the tribulations of oligarchic control due to the social rootedness of 
the PDI-P in certain milieus. Jokowi also seeks support outside of the usual party 
channels. The pre-sidentialization is, thus, also linked to a growing impact of non-party 
advisors and deal-makers such as Rini Soemarno, Amran Sulaimin and Luhut 
Panjaitan, and on money derived from non-party sources.
Another interesting development since mid-2016 is the shift of the dualism into civil 
society (Mietzner, 2017). Jokowi’s opponents, facing a president who largely controls 
Par-liament, supported radical Islamist groups such as the Front Pembela Islam (Islam 
Defen-ders Front) in order to mobilize against the then-Governor of Jakarta, the Christian 
Chinese Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (also known as ‘Ahok’). A string of mass 
demonstrations were not only directed against Ahok who was accused of blasphemy, but 
were also aimed at discre-diting Jokowi.
An erosion of the whole party system is possible if the older parties continue to 
dealign from the electorate, and vehicle parties (which lack meaningful traditions and 
platforms) or populists-cum-oligarchs like Prabowo use the generally low party 
identification and the dissatisfaction of many voters to seize the opportunity.
Notes
1. The Constitution of 1945 is still a revered, almost holy, script, and thus a return to it is enticing for 
many Indonesians. During the 2014 presidential elections, Prabowo Subianto brought forward 
this idea and essentially called for a system with a very strong president (Aspinall, 2015; 
Mietzner, 2015a).
2. Pancasila (five pillars) is the so-called state philosophy.
3. The MPR, which is the second chamber, consists of the DPR members and an additional 132 
parliamentarians who form the Regional Chamber (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah). The DPD 
has only consultative powers. Its members are elected through plurality votes in multi-
member constituencies at the provincial level and cannot belong to a political party.
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4. Independent candidates may also run, but the nomination requirements are still onerous.
5. The vote by the Akbar Tanjung faction against President Habibie (Golkar) and his accountabil-ity 
speech (given before the MPR in October 1999) does not fit Samuels and Shugart’s model 
because the president was not directly elected back in May 1998. As then vice president, 
Habibie automatically assumed office following Suharto’s resignation. Habibie inherited 
some of the presidential powers of Suharto but was eventually subject to the MPR. During his 
tenure, one might say that a transition from New Order presidentialism to a hybrid form of 
presidentialism/parliamentarism took place.
6. Both these practices are called blusukan.
7. Mujani and Liddle (2007, p. 850) wrote that Indonesia was likely to be a ‘genuine instance of the 
presidentialization of voting behaviour in a new democracy’.
8. Although political parties were strongly personalized, the campaign for the parliamentary 
election in June 1999 was not particularly influenced by strategic planning with respect to the 
indirect presidential election scheduled for October 1999.
9. In the 2014 presidential elections, only parties or coalitions that received at least 25% of the vote 
or 20% of the mandates in the preceding parliamentary elections were allowed to nomi-nate 
candidate pairs. Jokowi was nominated by a small coalition consisting of the PDI-P, the 
traditionalist Islamic PKB, Partai NasDem, and Hanura. Prabowo Subianto ran for his own party 
Gerindra, Golkar, and the Islamic parties PAN (which appointed Hatta Rajasa as vice presiden-tial 
candidate), PKS, and PPP.
10. This was decided upon at the party’s national meeting (Rakernas) in Semarang in September 
2014, notably on the suggestion of Jokowi. According to PDI-P deputy secretary general, 
Ahmad Basarah, the decision ‘represents the process of consensus democracy and guided 
democracy’ (Jakarta Post, ‘PDI-P congress’, 2015).
11. There is a growing literature on the success of multiparty presidentialism (Pereira & Melo, 
2012). The ‘Coalitional Presidentialism Project’ at the University of Oxford (Chaisty, Cheese-
man, & Power, 2015) looks at the surprising sustainability of multiparty presidentialism in 
Africa, Latin America, and postcommunist Europe. Presidents may use specific tools to 
secure support: legislative powers (through the initiation, deliberation, modification and 
enactment of laws), partisan powers (over their own party or allied parties within the coalition), 
cabinet management or cabinet allocation (via patronage distribution), budgetary powers (in the 
form of public spending in order to obtain targeted political support) and the exchange of favours 
between the president and legislators (Chaisty, Cheeseman & Power, 2015, p. 6ff).
12. This has already been dealt with by Kawamura (2013a).
13. Buying out whole factions is, in contrast to Thailand, unknown in Indonesia.
14. This pertains to Prabowo’s company Kiani Kertas and a governmental compensation fund for the 
victims of the Sidoarjo mudflow disaster, for which the company Lapindo, owned by Abur-izal 
Bakrie, is responsible.
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